Persistent Memory

Triggerfish agents have persistent cross-session memory. The agent can save facts, preferences, and context that survive across conversations, restarts, and even trigger wakeups. Memory is classification-gated -- the agent cannot read above its session taint or write below it.

Tools

memory_save

Save a fact or piece of information to persistent memory.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
key	string	yes	Unique identifier (e.g. user-name, project-deadline)
content	string	yes	The content to remember
tags	array	no	Tags for categorization (e.g. ["personal", "preference"])

Classification is automatically set to the current session's taint level. The agent cannot choose what level a memory is stored at.

memory_get

Retrieve a specific memory by its key.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
key	string	yes	The key of the memory to retrieve

Returns the memory content if it exists and is accessible at the current security level. Higher-classified versions shadow lower ones.

memory_search

Search across all accessible memories using natural language.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
query	string	yes	Natural language search query
max_results	number	no	Maximum results (default: 10)

Uses SQLite FTS5 full-text search with stemming. Results are filtered by the current session's security level.

memory_list

List all accessible memories, optionally filtered by tag.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
tag	string	no	Tag to filter by

memory_delete

Delete a memory by key. The record is soft-deleted (hidden but retained for audit).

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
key	string	yes	The key of the memory to delete

Can only delete memories at the current session's security level.

How Memory Works

Auto-Extraction

The agent proactively saves important facts the user shares -- personal details, project context, preferences -- using descriptive keys. This is prompt-level behavior guided by SPINE.md. The LLM picks what to save; the policy layer forces at what level.

Classification Gating

Every memory record carries a classification level equal to the session taint at the time it was saved:

• A memory saved during a CONFIDENTIAL session is classified CONFIDENTIAL
• A PUBLIC session cannot read CONFIDENTIAL memories
• A CONFIDENTIAL session can read both CONFIDENTIAL and PUBLIC memories

This is enforced by canFlowTo checks on every read operation. The LLM cannot bypass this.

Memory Shadowing

When the same key exists at multiple classification levels, only the highest-classified version visible to the current session is returned. This prevents information leakage across classification boundaries.

Example: If user-name exists at both PUBLIC (set during a public chat) and INTERNAL (updated during a private session), an INTERNAL session sees the INTERNAL version, while a PUBLIC session sees only the PUBLIC version.

Storage

Memories are stored via the StorageProvider interface (the same abstraction used for sessions, cron jobs, and todos). Full-text search uses SQLite FTS5 for fast natural language queries with stemming.

Security

• Classification is always forced to session.taint in the PRE_TOOL_CALL hook -- the LLM cannot choose a lower classification
• All reads are filtered by canFlowTo -- no memory above session taint is ever returned
• Deletes are soft-deletes -- the record is hidden but retained for audit
• The agent cannot escalate memory classification by reading high-classified data and re-saving it at a lower level (write-down prevention applies)

SECURITY The LLM never chooses memory classification. It is always

forced to the current session's taint level by the policy layer. This is a hard boundary that cannot be configured away. :::